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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ant) as lessee." The court intimates2 0 that it considered the defend-
ant under a contractual duty to pay rent and cites an early North
Carolina case2 l embodying a dictum 22 to the effect that an assignee
is ordinarily bound contractually for rent. If the decision is based
on this theory, there was no occasion for the court to pass on the
rule in Dumpor's Case, for the defendant was liable for the rent re-
gardless of the reassignment.
If the defendant was under no contractual duty to pay rent, he
would have been bound to do so only in case the reassignment was
invalid.P No grounds of invalidity appear, except a violation of the
condition not to assign without the lessor's consent. The application
of the rule in Dumpo's Case in the Childs Case situation would have
"wiped out" the condition before the reassignment. The judgment
for the plaintiff, therefore, would entail the existence of the condition
and a repudiation of the rule in Dumpor's Case.
If the defendant was under no contractual liability to pay rent,
the North Carolina court has refused to perpetuate a "venerable
error," and has placed a "reasonable construction" on a condition
that the lessee and his assigns will not assign the lease. If the defend-
ant was under contractual liability to pay rent, the language2 4 of the
court is strongly prophetic that the court will refuse to follow Dump-
ors Ccae when a proper case is presented.
W. T. COVINGTON, JR.
Master and Servant-Ratification of Tort by
Failure to Discharge.
Plaintiff passenger sues defendant railroad for alleged assault on
her by a Pullman porter while she was reclining in her berth. Held,
".. the lessee and his assigns agreed to pay the rent. ... The covenant to
pay rent is continuous in its nature, and such covenant is binding by express
provision upon the assigns of the lessee ...." This view, however, is in con-
flict with the authorities cited in note 17 supra, and would make every assignee
of the lease, for whatever length of time, responsible for the rent for the rest
of the term.
' Krider v. Ramsay, supra note 17, at 357.
" "The privity of estate and privity of contract still subsist between the
lessor and the assignee, as it did between the lessor and lessee."
" Cases cited in note 17 supra.
' Brogden, J.: ". .. a reasonable construction of the lease .. . leads to the
conclusion that the restriction against assigning . . . operated upon . . . the
assigns of the lessee as well as himself" and ."one assignment did not waive
the conditions of the lease" so that "thereafter any subsequent assignee could
turn the (lessor's) property over to the use and occupancy of any undesirable
and irresponsible person without his approval."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
plaintiff may recover only actual damages, failure to discharge the
porter not being a ratification of the tort to justify a recovery of
punitive damages.'
A railroad, as a public service corporation, owes a special duty
of care and protection to its passengers, the breach of which by, a
servant entails actual damages without resort to the doctrine of
respond eat superior.2 A ratification by the railroad of this breach
entails punitive damages.
As to what constitutes a ratification, railroad cases either hold,4
or imply in dicta,5 as in the principal case,6 that retention is relevant
evidence of ratification which may go to the jury, but not sufficient
to warrant its submission to the jury unaccompanied by other evi-
dence of ratification.7 However, the fact of retention is irrelevant
where the master is not fully aware of the tortious character of the
servant's act and believes the servant's account of the affair.8
In cases of injury occurring outside the scope of employment,
where the question is one of fixing liability for actual damages only,
retention after knowledge of the tort9 is either held, 10 or mentioned
'Pullman Co. v. Hall, 46 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
'(1929) 17 CAIzi. L. Ruv. 185.
Bass v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 24 Am. Rep. 437 (1877)
(expulsion from train by brakeman).
"Bass v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra note 3; Goddard v. Grand Trunk
R. Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. Rep. 39 (1869) (assault by brakeman); St. Louis &
Chicago R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200, 24 Am. Rep. 689 (1876) (assaule by
servants off duty and conductor's refusal to interfere); Dillingham v. An-
thony, 73 Tex. 47, 11 S. W. 139, 3 L. I A. 634 (1889) (misconduct of
conductor).
'See Tangner v. S. W. Mo. Electric R. Co., 85 Mo. App. 28, 32 (1900)
(conductor's wanton conduct toward passenger); Pullman Co. v. Alexander,
117 Miss. 348, 78 So. 293, 294 (1918) (porter's mistreatment of negro pas-
senger) ; Craker v. R. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504, 513 (1875) (con-
ductor's assault on female passenger); Gasway v. Atlanta W. P. R. Co.,
58 Ga. 216, 221 (1877) (misconduct of conductor); Ricketts v. Chesapeake &
0. R. Co., 33 W. Va. 433, 10 S. E. 800, 803 (1890) (assault on passenger).
Pullman Co. v. Hall, supra note 1.
Voves v. G. N. R. Co., 26 N. D. 110, 143 N. W. 760 (1913) (conductor's
assault and battery on passenger) ; Toledo, St. Louis & W. R. Co. v. Gordon,
143 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906) (expulsion from moving train by conductor).
'Donivan v. Manhattan R. Co., 21 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1893) (expulsion of
passenger from platform); Williams v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 40 La. Ann.
87, 3 So. 631 (1888) (porter's vicious assault on passenger) ; Paul v. So. R. Co.,
158 S. C. 550, 155 S. E. 884 (1930) (conductor's assault).
'It would be otherwise without such knowledge: Mann v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co. of Tenn., 132 S. C. 193, 129 S. E. 79 (1925) (slander by company's
superintendent of agents); Turner v. American District Telegraph & Mes-
senger Co., 94 Conn. 707, 110 Atl. 540 (1920) (a shooting by company's
roundsman).
'0 Sullivan v. People's Ice Corp., 92 Calif. App. 740, 268 Pac. 934 (1928)
(assault by driver of ice -wagon).
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ilh dicta,11 to be relevant evidence of ratification which may be sub-
mitted to the jury when accompanied by other such evidence. How-
ever, some cases hold to the contrary and say that retention in such
cases is not relevant.12  Most cases place emphasis-and it seems
quite correctly-on the question whether the tort purported to be in
the master's interest, holding that if it did not, retention is not relevant
evidence of ratification. 13 But at least one case disregards this dis-
tinction and holds that retention is not relevant even where the tort
was committed in the master's interest. 14
The instant case seems to be in line with the weight of authority
in refusing to hold that retention alone amounts to a ratification of
the servant's tort as a matter of law. Such a holding would indeed
impose an injustice on master and servant alike. The same would
be true of a rule that evidence of retention is alone sufficient to carry
the case to the jury, since ordinary juries are notoriously prejudiced
against railroads. To constitute ratification, the conduct should
dearly evince an intent to ratify. The failure to discharge may be
impelled by motives completely foreign to those of ratifying. Either
rule might lead to the discharge of many innocent and worthy serv-
ants, due to the fact that the master would prefer to discharge rather
than run the risk of assuming liability for the servant's act.
F. P. SPRUILL, JR.
See Wells v. Robinson Bros. Mot. Co., 153 Miss. 451, 121 So. 141, 142
(1929) (assault and battery by automobile salesman) ; CoBb v. Simon, 119 Wis.
597, 97 N. W. 276, 278 (1903) (assault and false imprisonment of customer by
floorwalker); McFadden v. Anderson Mot. Co., 121 S. C. 407, 114 S. E. 402,
403 (1922) (automobile collision with plaintiff) ; International & G. N. R. Co.
v. McDonald, 75 Tex. 41, 12 S. W. 860, 862 (1889) (negligent railroad col-
lision with automobile).
I Kastrup v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 129 Kan. 398, 282 Pac. 742 (1929)
(assault by superintendent trying to collect a bill) ; Gulf, Chicago & Santa Fe
R. Co. v. Kirkbride, 79 Tex. 457, 15 S. W. 495 (1891) (plaintiff forced to jump
from moving train); Edelman v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 3 Mo. App. 503
(1877) (collision with wagon driven by defendant's servant).
"Mandel v. Byram, 191 Wis. 446, 211 N. W. 145 (1926) (assault and bat-
tery by railroad rate clerk on plaintiff shipper); Chaney v. The Frigidaire
Corp., 31 F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) (assault by salesman on prospective
female customer); Gratton v. Suedmeyer, 144 Mo. App. 719, 129 S. W. 1038
(1910) (assault by contractor's employee) ; Home Telephone & Electric Co. v.
Branton, 7 S. W. (2d) 627 (Tex. 1928) (assault by local manager of telephone
company); Knight v. Laurens Motor Car Co., 108 S. C. 179, 93 S. E. 869
(1917) (negligent act by mechanic during a joy ride) ; Everingham v. Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co., 148 Iowa 662, 127 N. W. 1009 (1910) (assault); Kweichin v.
Holms & Hallowell Co., 106 Minn. 148, 118 N. W. 668, 19 L. R. A. 255 (1908)
(negligence of wagon driver).
1' Pruitt v. Goldstein Millinery Co., 169 Ky. 655, 184 S. W. 1134 (1916)
(slander by employee).
